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Abstract 
We give an axiomatization of confidence transfer 
- a known conditioning scheme - from the 
perspective of expectation-based inference in the 
sense of Gardenfors and Makinson. Then, we use 
the notion of belief independence to "filter out" 
different proposals of possibilistic conditioning 
rules, all are variations of confidence transfer. 
Among the three rules that we consider, only 
Dempster's rule of conditioning passes the test of 
supporting the notion of belief independence. 
With the use of this conditioning rule, we then 
show that we can use local computation for 
computing desired conditional marginal 
possibilities of the joint possibility satisfying 
the given constraints. It turns out that our local 
computation scheme is already proposed b y  
Shenoy. However, our intuitions are completely 
different from that of Shenoy. While Shenoy 
just defines a local computation scheme that fits 
his framework of valuation-based systems, we 
derive that local computation scheme from ll(�) 
= ll(� I o.) * ll(a) and appropriate independence 
assumptions, just like how the Bayesians derive 
their local computation scheme. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The theory of possibility [Zadeh 78] formalizes a notion 
of belief that may be described as follows. Let fl be a 
finite, non-empty set of propositional primitives. Let 
Xp be the least set of formulas containing fl, closed 
under..., and " (with the usual abbreviations v and :::J). Let 
El be the set of all interpretations of 'f. A possibility 
measure n is a function from the set of all propositions 
2 El to the real interval [0, I]. n satisfies three 
conditions: 1 
1 We write a to mean either a fonnula a or a set [a](� 8); [a] 
is the set of all models of a. 
(i) ll{.l) = 0 I* it is impossible for any 
unsatisfiable proposition to be true */ 
(ii) ll(T) = I I* a tautology is never less than totally 
possible (i.e., always 1) */ 
(iii) ll(a v �) == max(ll(a), n(�)) 
I* the basic postulate of possibility *I 
For any proposition a, 1 - ll(a) represents "my potential 
degree of surprise upon realizing that a is true" [Shackle 
61; Hsia 91]. n is such that either ll(o.) = 1, or ll(-·-.o.) 
= 1, or both, since max(II(o.), ll(-.o.)) = ll(a v -.a)= 
ll(T) = l. Therefore by equating "believe a" with 0(-.a) 
< I (meaning that ..., a is considered to be less possible, 
while a is considered to be totally possible), we see that 
the notion of belief here is that we do not believe in both 
o. and ..., a at the same time. This conforms to our 
everyday use of the word 'believe'. 
From n. we can define its density junction Jt : e - [0, 
1], where Jt{ro) = ll {{ro}). Jt is also known as a 
possibility distribution. It completely determines n. And 
so one other way of understanding possibility theory is to 
postulate the existence of a possibility distribution Jt on 
a. Jt is such that there is always a world (l) that is totally 
possible (:�t(ro) = 1), while n is induced by Jt in that ll(A) 
= max{Jt(m): ro E A}. This view of possibility theory 
has a close analogy with probability theory (just replace 
maximum by addition) : a probability distribution p is 
such that :E{p(ro): roE 9} == 1� moreover, P(A) = 
:E{p(c.o): c.o E A). 
Over the years, there have been several suggestions 
concerning the "right" conditioning rule(s) to use in 
possibility theory. Two often-mentioned rules are, 
respectively, the minimum rule of conditioning (what 
Dubois and Prade [86, 91] use in their reasoning approach) 
and Dempster's ru1e of conditioning (the "official" 
conditioning rule that is used in the theory of belief 
function [Shafer 76; Smets 88]). These two rules, 
together with a third but less-known rule due to Yager 
[87], are all instances of a generic conditioning scheme 
called confidence transfer (also known as belief transfer 
[Smets 88]). And so two questions are of interest. One, 
is there any reason why we should be interested in 
confidence transfer? Two, if we are to use one particular 
instance of confidence transfer as our "official" 
conditioning rule, which conditioning rule should we use? 
In this paper, we seek to justify confidence transfer from a 
logic-based perspective. Specifically, we give an 
axiomatization from the standpoint of expectation-based 
inference in the sense of Giirdenfors and Makinson [94]. 
By strengthening a proposal for making belief revisions 
that is due to Rott [91], we derive the notion of confidence 
transfer. To choose an appropriate instance of confidence 
transfer as our official rule of conditioning, we then use 
the notion of belief independence to "filter out" different 
proposals. Among the three rules of conditioning that we 
mentioned, only Dempster's rule passes the test of 
supporting the notion of belief independence. Though we 
cannot rule out all possible alternatives (there are 
infinitely many of them), Dempster's rule does seem to be 
our only natural choice. 
Other authors have also tried to justify some of the 
conditioning rules that we mentioned. Dubois and Prade 
[86], for example, used an equation ((I) below) proposed 
by Hisdal [78] to justify both the minimum rule and 
Dempster's rule.2 
IT( a" fl) =IT( � I a) op IT( a), where op is a binary 
operator (I) 
Smets [93], on the other hand, gives an explicit 
axiomatization of Dempster's rule of conditioning in a 
rather abstract setting (where he talks about all  
"reasonably defined" credibility functions). I t  is 
interesting to note that both of these two attempts are 
related to the Bayesian approach in some way. Equation 
(1), for example, originates directly from the probabilistic 
conditioning rule P(a" fl) = P(� I a) * P(a) [Risdal 78]. 
And even though Smets works on an abstract level, he 
nevertheless requires that if probabilities are used as 
credibility functions, then the general conditioning rule 
that he is trying to derive must reduce to a rule that 
preserves additivity. Thus, these authors more or less rely 
on the a priori existence of the Bayesian approach in order 
for their work to be fully meaningful. This is not the 
case here. What we need here is an a priori notion of 
belief independence, among others. 
Suppose we do use Dempster's rule of conditioning as our 
official rule of conditioning, we can then use the so-called 
"causal net" technique [Pearl 88] for modular 
specifications, and use local computation for computing 
conditional marginal possibilities. As it turns out, our 
local computation scheme is already described in Shenoy 
[92]. However, the underlying intuitions are completely 
different. Shenoy [89] builds his framework of valuation­
based systems on top of the three axioms of local 
computation proposed by Shenoy and Shafer [90]. Then 
he just defines a local computation scheme for possibility 
2Dubois and Pr ade [86. 88] also used what they call the 
principle of minimum specificity in their justification. 
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theory that fits in his framework. Here, we derive that 
local computation scheme from TI(fl) = TI(� I a)* IT( a) 
and appropriate independence assumptions, just like how 
the Bayesians derive their local computation scheme (see, 
for example, [Pearl 86; Lauritzen and Spiegelhalter 88]). 
There are also other related work in the past [Dubois and 
Prade 90a; Fonck 90]. But the aims and tasks are 
completely different. Dubois and Prade [90a], for 
example, base their work on the assumption that 
possibilities can be combined, and they showed that their 
combination scheme can be computed using local 
computation. Fonck [90] also reported what amounts to a 
special case of the work of Dubois and Prade [90a]. The 
main difference between these past works and ours is in 
the kind of problems solved. For Dubois and Prade [90a] 
and Fonck [90], the problem is to compute (using local 
computation) marginalizations of a combined possibility 
measure (on 28) from several given possibility measures 
(also on 2 8). For us, the problem here is to compute 
(again using local computation) marginalizations of the 
joint possibility measure satisfying the given constraints. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 
2, we introduce the inference paradigm of Gardenfors and 
Makinson [94], and we show how confidence transfer can 
be derived by strengthening their notion of inference in a 
perlectly reasonable way. In Section 3, we introduce the 
notion of belief independence, and show that Dempster's 
rule is the only one that is acceptable among the three 
rules that we consider. In Section 4, we describe how we 
can use the proposal of Pearl [86] to specify "prior" 
possibilities and conditional possibilities, and we use 
local computation to compute desired marginals from the 
given specifications. Section 5 concludes. 
2 AN AXIOMATIC JUSTIFICATION OF 
CONFIDENCE TRANSFER 
Recently, Giirdenfors and Makinson [94] proposed the 
following approach for nonmonotonic reasoning. First, 
we give two sets 1 and A of formulas; 1 is a set of hard, 
non-defeasible constraints (e.g., r = {Penguin::> Bird}); A 
includes r and all of our soft, defeasible expectations 
(e.g., A= 1 U {Bird ::> Fly, Penguin::> ..., Ay, ... } ),3 and 
is closed under logical consequence. Next, we assume the 
existence of an ordering 2:E of all sentences. 2::E is called 
an expectation ordering, and satisfies the following 
axioms. (Below, a, �.andy are propositional formulas, 
while 1- is the usual propositional provability symboL) 
(E l) If a 2:E � and fl 2:E y, then a 2:E y; 
(E2) If 11- a:J l3, then l3 2:E a; 
(E3) Either a " � 2:E a or a " fl 2:E 13; 
3we are assuming that some extraordinary penguins do fly. 
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a �E � means a is at least as expected as � (or ..., a is at 
least as surprising as ..., �)- We write a >E � to mean that 
a �E f3 and not � �E a, and we write a =E � to mean that 
a �E � and � �E a. 
Once we have specified r and A ,  and also postulated the 
existence of ::s;E, we can then make inferences from our 
given information a according to the following principle 
of reasoning that is due to Rott [91]. 
a nonmonotonically entails y, denoted as a 1�E y, 
if and only if 
r U {a} U {�: � E A and p >E -.a}�- Y· 
1�E is called a comparative expectation inference relation. 
As it happens, (El) - (F3), together with a fourth axiom 
(call it E4) that T > .l, are equivalent to the axioms 
underlying necessity measures [Dubois 86; Dubois and 
Prade 90b] -the mathematical equivalent of consonant 
belief functions [Shafer 76]. 
A consonant m-value function (or just m-value 
junction) is a function m: z9- [0, 1] that satisfies 
the following three conditions: 
(1) LB�em(B) = 1, I* confidence in T must be 
the maximum possible *I 
(2) m(0) = 0, and I* there must be no 
confidence in .l *I 
(3) There are nested subsets of 9 S1, S2, ... , SN 
(S1 c s2 c ... c SN � 9) such that m(x) "# 
Oif and only ifxE {S1,S2·····SN}- (St, 
S2, ... ,SNare called the focal elements of 
m.) I* confidence is structured hierarchically 
*I 
Every consonant m-value function induces a 
consonant belief junction 
Cam: z9- [0, 1] as follows: C<>m(a) = 
LB�[a]m(B), that is, the Cam value of a formula a 
is computed by adding up the m-values of all subsets 
of [a]. (Below, we write Co instead of C<>m 
whenever no confusion will result.) 
Co is the mathematical dual of n, and the relation is that 
Co( a)= 1- II(-·• a). 
Since (El)- (E4) actually characterize all consonant belief 
functions, it is tempting to think that perhaps we can 
view the comparative expectation inference relation of 
Gardenfors and Makinson [94] and Rott [91] as some kind 
of updating (or conditioning) mechanism for consonant 
belief functions. But to translate the proposal of Rott 
into the framework of consonant belief functions, we need 
to solve two problems. The first problem is as follows. 
Even though it is assumed that there is a complete 
ordering ::!:Eon Xp when there is no information (i.e., a 
is just n. nothing is said about the (new) ordering on Xp 
when there is some information. To be fair, this is not 
the concern of either Rott [91] or Gardenfors and 
Makinson [94], for they are only interested in what ought 
to be inferred when the given information is a. But here 
we obviously need to say something meaningful about 
this new ordering. As for the second "problem" with 
Rott's original proposal, it is just that quantification is 
not considered for obvious reasons. Below, we strengthen 
Rott's proposal so that both problems are solved in a 
reasonable way. We need a basic axiom though. 
(Dl) Co( .Ia) is a consonant belief function on 9. 
Intuitively, Dl just says that we still have a complete 
ordering on Xp when we are given the information a; 
this ordering satisfies (El) - (E4), and Co(.la) is its 
numerical counterpart. (Below, we use Co(� I a) as a 
shorthand for Co(.la)(� ).) 
Let us now see how a new ordering can be inferred from 
the old ordering and a. Following Gardenfors and 
Makinson [94], we let A be the set {P : P >E .l}. This 
shortens the definition of a I�E y tor u {a} u {�: p >E 
.... a} 1- y. When r U {a} is consistent, we arrive at an 
even simpler definition: {a} U {� : � >E ..., a }  1- Y · 
Translated into consonant belief functions, a 1- E y 
becomes Co(y I a)> 0, and Rott's proposal becomes the 
following. 
Co(y I a)> 0 iff 3 �. Co(p) > Co(--.a) and 
1- a " � ::> y. (II) 
We remark that (II) actually should be written as "if 
Co( -.a)< 1 then ( II)", since the prerequisite for (II) is that 
f U {a} is consistent (which is translated into Co(..., a) < 
1). However, our axiomatization will be such that 
Co(.la) is undefined when Co(-. a ) =  1. And so to 
facilitate our discussions, we leave (II) as it is. Lemma 
2.1 below shows that (III) is a reformulation of ( II). 
Co(y I a)> 0 iff Co( a ::> y )  > Co(..., a). (III) 
Lemma 2.1. Co( a :J y )  > Co(..., a) iff 3 �, Co(�) 
>Co(-. a) and 1- aA� ::> y. 
Proof: (=>)just let � be a ::> y. 
(<=)Let � be such that Co(�)> Co(-.a) and I- aA� 
:J y. 1- � ::> (a ::> y). And so Co( a ::> y) �Co(�)> 
Co(-.a). 0 
Thus by Rott's proposal, to see whether y ought to be 
expected when the given information is a, we just see if 
our (original) expectation of a :J y is higher than our 
expectation of .... a. But still, nothing is said about the 
new ordering among those newly expected propositions. 
In particular, how should we order � andy if Co( a :J �) = 
Co( a :J y), and how should we order � andy if Co( a :J 
�) > Co(a ::> y )? Below, (D2) states that when the 
context is a, the difference in our (new) expectations of f3 
andy should at least match the difference in our (original) 
expectations of a::> � and a ::> y. 
(Dl) If Co( a :J �) 0!: Co( a :J y) 
then Co(� I a)- Co(y I a) 0!: Co(a j �).- Co(a :J y) 
(D2) implies that if � and y are such that a :J � and a :J 
y are equal y expected in the first place, then our 
expectations of � andy should rationally be the same 
when the context is that a is true. Thus, Co(ala) = 
Co(T I a)= 1, since Co(a :J a) = Co(a :J T). This 
means Co(-.a I a)= 0 (by D1). For any y, either Co(a 
:J y) > Co( a :J .... a) or Co( a :J y) = Co( a :J ...., a) 
(since 1- .., a :J (a :J y)). In the first case, Co(y I a) -
Co(.., a I a) � Co( a :J y)- Co( a :J .., a) > 0, i.e., Co(y I 
a) > 0. In the second case, Co(y I a)= Co(.., a I a) = 0. 
And so (III), i.e., Rott's proposal, is a logical consequence 
of (D2). 
(D2) only defines the relative differences among the new 
expectations. Below, (D3) states that if we ever want to 
decrease our expectation of � when the context is a, we 
should not be overdoing it. After all, it is -.a that we use 
as the "threshold" for determining new expectations in the 
first place. And so the decrease should not be more than 
Co(--.a), our original expectation of .... a. 
(DJ) Co( � I a) 0!: Co(�)- Co( -.a) 
This completes our axiomatization of conditioning. Note 
that if Co(-.a) is 1. then Co(. Ia) is undefined due to (D l)  
and (D2). We remark that Dubois and Prade [91, 
Proposition 5] proved something similar to (III). But 
what they did is completely different from what we are 
doing here. While Dubois and Prade [91] derived 
something similar to (III) from some given definition of 
Co(.la) (i.e., their version of the minimum rule), we are 
trying to strengthen (III) and then derive the definition (a 
family of definitions in fact) of Co(.la). 
Suppose Co(-.a) < 1. Let us now find an algorithm for 
deriving Co(. la) from Co and a. From (D1), we know 
we must construct a consonant belief function on 61. (D2) 
implies that Co(ala) = 1. Therefore all focal elements of 
Co(. Ia) are subsets of [a]. Let the focal elements of 
Co(. Ia) be S1, � . ... , Sn (S 1 C Sz C ... C Sn � [a]). 
Let R1, Rz, ... , Rm be the focal elements of Co such that 
R 1 C R2 C .. . C Rm � 9 and R 1 is the smal est focal 
element of Co that has a non-empty intersection with [a] 
(the existence of Rt is guaranteed by Co( -.a)< 1). (D2) 
implies that if Co( a :J �) =Co( a :J y), then Co(� I a)= 
Co(y I a). And so for every Sj• there is an Ri such that 
Sj = Ri n [a]. (D2) also implies that if Co(a :J �) > 
Co(a :J y), then Co(� I a)- Co(y I a) (� Co(a :J �)­
Co( a :::>y)) > 0. And so for every Rj. there is an Sj such 
that Sj = Ri n [a]. For every j (I s:j s: n), define tG ) as 
follows: R 1> R2, ... , Rt(l) are all those Ri's such that S 1 
= Rj n [a], and Rr(i-1)+1• Rt(j-1)+2• ... , Rr(i) are all 
those Ri's such that Sj = Rj n [a]. By (D3), we know 
that m(S1 I a)= Co(S1 I a) = Co([-. a] U S1 l a)� 
Co([ -.a] U S1) - Co(-. a)= m(R1) + m(R z) + ... + 
m(Rt( l )) (m(S1 I a) is a shorthand for m(.la)(S1), and 
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m(.la) is the m-value function associated with Co(.la)). 
By (D2), we know that for every j (2 s:j s: n), m(Sj I a)= 
Co(Sj I a) - Co(Sj-1 I a) 0!: Co([.., a] U Sj) - Co([-. a] U 
Sj-1) = m(Rt(j-1)+1) + m(Rt(j-1)+2) + ... + m<Rtm>· 
Let m(S1 I a) = m(R1) + m(R2) + ... + m(Rt(1)) + c1; 
and for every j (2 s;j s; n),let m(Sj I a)= m(RtG-1)+1) + 
m(Rt(j-1)+2) + ... + m(Rt(j)) + Cj• where cj's are non-
negative numbers. Then L cj = L j=1 ,nm(Sj I a) -
Li=l,mm(Ri) = 1- Lj=l,mm(Ri) = Co(-.a). This is a 
known conditioning scheme called confidence transfer 
(also known as belief transfer [Smets 88]).4 Below, we 
give its definition in terms of possibilities so as to 
facilitate our discussion in the next sections. 
Confidence transfer (the algorithm). Let IT 
be a possibility measure over 261. If IT(a) ;;t-. 0 (i.e., 
a is not considered impossible), then :rt(.la), the 
density function of IT(.Ia), can be computed using the 
following algorithm. 
(1) If w fi. [a], then :rt( wla) is assigned 0. 
(2) As for elements of [a], do the following. 
First partition the elements of [a] by their 
(original) possibilities, that is, 
let {Al• A2, .... An} be a partition of [a] such 
that V i, j E {1, 2, ... , n}, V Wi E �. V Wj E 
Aj• :rt(wi) = :rt(Wj) if i = j, and :rt(c.oj) < :rt(c.oj) if i 
<j. 
Next, choose n non-negative real numbers c1, cz, 
... , Cn according to some arbitrary but fixed rule, 
so that Li=l.n<'i = l - ll(a). (We call this rule a 
normalization rule and 1 -IT( a) the 
normalization constant). 
Finally, V c.o E Ai• :rt(wla) is assigned the value 
:rt(w) + c1 + cz + ... + q. 
Note that in the algorithm of confidence transfer, there is a 
parameter - a normalization rule - that still needs to be 
specified. Depending on what this rule is, different 
conditioning rules can result. Theorem 2.2 summarizes 
the above discussion. 
Theorem 2.2. (Axiomatic justification of 
confidence transfer) 
Let O!:E be an expectation ordering on �p. and let IT 
be an element of the family of possibility measures 
induced by O!:E (IT( -.a) s: fl( .. �) iff a O!:E �). 
4The name "confidence transfer" is used here, because 
essentially what ha ppens is that the (old) m-value of a set [a 
:> PI is "transferred" to the set !PI (and we just add up what !PI 
receives). 
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Suppose TI(a) � 0. Then the set of possibility 
measures IT( .Ia) defined by (Dl) - (D3) is the same as 
the set of possibility measures that are obtained from 
IT and a using the algorithm of confidence transfer. 
3 BELIEF INDEPENDENCE AND 
DEMPSTER'S RULE OF 
CONDITIONING 
Consider again the algorithm of confidence transfer 
described at the end of the last section. Suppose we use a 
normalization rule that assigns l - IT( a) to c1 and O's to 
c2, ... , and Cn· Then this is the conditioning rule that 
Yager [87] proposed. If, on the other hand, we let Cn be 1 
-IT( a) and q . . .. , and Cn-1 be 0, then this is essentially 
the minimum rule of conditioning that Dubois and Prade 
[86, 91] use in their reasoning approach.5 But if we 
distribute 1 - IT (a)  in such a way that :rt ( ro Ia ) = 
3t(ro)/Il(a), then we will be working with Dempster's rule 
of conditioning. With this rule, IT(� I a)= IT(aA� I a)= 
max{3t(ro I a): roE [a A �]}= max{:rt(ro)/ll(a): roE 
[a A �]} = IT(a A �) I IT (a). This looks just like the 
probabilistic rule of conditioning, with P (probability) 
replaced by IT (possibility). 
In order to choose among all these different proposals for 
the normalization rule, we use the notion of belief 
independence. The idea is as follows. Suppose a and 13 
are two propositions that are judged to be independent of 
each other. Then whatever we learn about a 
(alternatively, �). it should not have any effect on our 
opinion about � (alternatively, a). Any conditioning rule 
that we use should allow us to express this intuition. 
This means, on the formal level, that there must exist a 
solution, a possibility measure, that satisfies the 
following constraints when none of IT( a), IT( ...,a), IT(fl), 
and IT(..., fJ) is 0. 
IT(a) =IT( a I fJ) =IT( a I ..., 13). IT(..., a)= IT(..., a I �) = 
IT(...,a I ...,13). 
IT(fJ) = IT(fll a)= IT(fll...,a), IT(...,I3) = IT( ...,I31 a)= 
IT(-.j31 -.a). 
To facilitate the proofs, let us consider the case in which 
both a and 13 are expected; none of the expectations are 
total, and the expectations are different. In other words, 
0 < IT(-.j3) < IT(-.a) < 0.5. 
Now, if our conditioning rule is the minimum rule of 
conditioning, then there is no possibility measure IT that 
satisfies the above constraints. Let us prove by 
contradiction. Suppose there is such a measure IT. Then 
IT(-.al -.13) = IT(-.a) � 1 (by the constraints). But IT(-.a 
1-.13 ) = IT (-.aA-.13 1-.13 ). And so IT(-.a 1-.�) = 
5The only difference is that, when using their minimum rule, 
ll(.la) is defined (to be 1) when ll(a) = 0. 
IT(-.aA-.13 1-.fl) = IT(-.aA-.13) (since the minimum rule 
is such that IT(..., a A...,� I ..., fl) is either IT(..., aA -.13) or 1). 
This implies that IT(-. a) = IT(..., a A...,�). And so IT( -.13) = 
IT(-.fl v (-.aA-.fl))=max(IT(-.j3), IT(-.aA-.�)) = 
max(IT( -.j3 ), IT(..., a)), which contradicts our assumption 
that IT(-.13) < IT(-.a). 
Similarly, if our conditioning rule is what Yager [87] 
proposed, then there is no possibility measure IT that 
satisfies the above constraints either. Again we prove by 
contradiction. Suppose there is such a measure IT. Then 
IT(-. a I -.fl ) = IT (-.aA .... I3 I -.fJ) = IT (-.aA-.13) + (1-
IT(...,�)) (since Yager's proposal is such that IT(y I .., 13) = 
IT(y) + (1- IT( .... fl)) for every y such that y :::> .., fl). And 
so IT(..., a) = IT(.., (I I ..., �) = IT(-. a A-. fl) + ( l - IT(.., 13 )) > 
0.5, which contradicts our assumption that IT(-.a) < 0.5. 
Contrasting to these two rules, a unique solution exists if 
the rule we use is Dempster's rule of conditioning. 
Theorem 3.1. (Joint possibility from 
independent marginal possibilities) 
Let a 1, a2, ... , an be n mutually exclusive formulas 
(i.e., exactly one of the ai's is true), and let 13t, 132· ... , 
�m be m mutually exclusive formulas. Suppose that 'tf 
i (1 s: is: n), 'tf j (1 s: is: m), IT(Uj) and IT(flj) are 
given. Also suppose that 'tf i, IT(Uj) = IT(Uj 1 13). 
where 13 is any formula that is built up from the Jlj's 
using the logical connectives and IT(�)� 0, and that 'tf 
j, IT(flj) = ll(�j I a), where a is any formula that is 
built up from the Uj'S using the logical connectives and 
IT(a) � 0. ("I" is Dempster's rule of conditioning.) 
Then IT is that 'tf i,j, IT(Uj A flj) = IT(Uj) * IT(�j), 
where * is the usual multiplication operation. 
Proof: First, we show that if there is a solution IT, 
then IT must be such that 'tf i, j, IT( C1j A flj) = 
IT(Uj)*IT(I3j)· This is easy. 'tf j (1 s: j s: m), either 
ll(J3j) = 0 or IT(J3j) � 0. In the first case, V i  (1 s: i s:  
n), IT(Uj A fl_j) = 0 = IT(ai)*IT(�j). In the second 
case, 'tf i (1 s: i s: n), IT( Uj) = IT( Uj 113j) = IT( ai A l3j 
I l3j) = IT(ai 11 l3j)II1(flj), that is, IT(Uj A flj) = 
IT(Uj)*IT(I3j)· 
Next, we show that IT is a solution, where IT is such 
that 'tf i,j, IT(Uj A l3j) = IT(Uj)*ll(j3j)- Without loss 
of generality,let us assume that 1 = IT(a1) > IT(a2) 
> ... > IT( an) (just put those with the same 
possibility into one set). It suffices to just consider 
conditioning IT on a, where a is any formula that is 
built up from the Uj's using the logical connectives 
and IT( a)� 0. {[ai A fljl : 1 s: is: n, 1 s:j s: m}, a 
partition of 8, can be viewed as a matrix with n rows 
and m columns; each row represents an Uj; each 
column represents a flj; and each entry <i,j> 
represents the proposition C1j A l3j- [a] then consists 
of several rows of this matrix. Let the ordinal 
numbers of these rows be .sQ. (e.g., if .sQ. = {1, 3, 7}, 
then [a] consists of the first, third, and seventh row 
of the matrix; clearly, .sQ. C { 1, 2, ... , n} ), and let k 
be the smallest element of .sQ.. II( a)= II(ak). And 
so V j (1 sj s m), II(�j I a)= max{II(Uj" �j I a) : 
1 s i s n} = max{II(Uj " �j)fii(a): i E .sQ.}= 
max{II(Uj 11 �j)/II(ak): i E .sQ. } = 
max{II(Uj)*Il$_;)/Il(ak): i E .sQ. } = max{II(Uj): i E 
.sQ. }*ll@j)lll(ak) = ll(ak)*ll(�j)III(ak) = ll(�j)· 0 
Clearly, Dempster's rule is the only one that is acceptable 
among the three rules that we considered. Also, it seems 
that no other natural normalization rule can be used in 
order that the notion of belief independence is supported 
(for example, it can be shown that Theorem 3.1 does not 
hold if the conditioning rule we use distributes the 
normalization constant evenly among the q's). However, 
we cannot rule out all other normalization rules. Because 
we are talking about all "arbitrary but fixed rules" here. 
And so we can only say that Dempster's rule is the only 
natural variation of confidence transfer that is known to be 
"qualified" in supporting the notion of belief 
independence. 
4 POSSIBILISTIC PROPAGATION 
Suppose we do use Dempster's rule as our official rule of 
conditioning, then we can use the so-called "causal net" 
technique [Pearl 88] for modular specifications, and use 
local computation to compute conditional marginal 
possibilities from the joint possibility satisfying the 
given constraints. It turns out that the propagation scheme 
that we use is already described in Shenoy [92]. However, 
as we have pointed out in Section 1, our intuition is 
completely different from that of Shenoy [92]. For us, it 
is not just a local computation scheme that we want. 
There has to be a firm semantic basis underlying this 
computation scheme, so that we know how to use it 
(correctly) for reasoning. For this reason, we think it is 
worthwhile to describe our reasoning approach in its 
entirety, and not just part of it. This is what we do in 
this section. Below, we just give an informal illustration. 
The interested reader should consult [Pearl 88] for aspects 
of modular specifications and [Pearl 86; Lauritzen and 
Spiegelhalter 88; Shenoy 89, 92, 94; Shenoy and Shafer 
90] for aspects of local computation. 
The technique of modular specification starts with the 
specification of a directed acyclic graph G. Take Figure 
4.1 as an example. It specifies what we think about the 
causal relations among a (possible) earth quake, a 
(possible) burglary into our house, the (possible) sound of 
an alarm in our house, (possible) radio announcements of 
the earth quake, and (possible) phone calls (informing us 
of the alarm) from our two neighbors Watson and Gibbon. 
Each node of G represents a propositional primitive P, and 
contains two values T and F (representing two possible 
truth values of P). If (P 1• Q), (P2, Q), ... , (P n• Q) are all 
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the edges that point to Q in G, then it means that our 
judgment of the truth or falsity of Q is fixed once the 
truth values of P 1, P 2· ... , and P n are known (independent 
of what the truth values of other primitives are). If a node 
P has no edge pointing to it (i.e., P is a "root node"), then 
it means that our judgment of P (a "prior") can be assessed 
directly without knowing the value of any primitive. 
Figure 4.1: The alarm problem (from Pearl [88]) 
To specify a possibility measure II, we just specify the 
priors and conditionals. That is, for each "root node" P, 
we specify IT(P) and IT(.., P); and if (P1, Q), (P2, Q), ... , 
(P n, Q) are all the edges of G that point to Q, then we 
specify IT(Qia) and IT( -.Qia) for every formula a of the 
form L1 A L2 A ... A Lu. where 4 (1 sis n) is either Pi 
or ..,pi· In terms of the above example, our specification 
can be Il(B) = IT(-.B) = II(E) = II(-.E) = l. II(-.AIB�t.E) = 
.05, II (.., A I B" .., E) = .4, II (.., A 1-. B " E) = .85, 
Il(AI-.B�t.-.E) = .05, ll ( -.RIE) = .05, Il(RI-. E) = 0, 
II(-. WIA) = .8, II(WI-. A)= II(-. WI-. A)= 1, Il(-.GIA) = 
.8, and II(GI-.A) = fl(-.GhA) = 1. (We need not specify 
a value for. e.g., II(AIBAE); its value has to be 1, because 
ll(-.AIB�t.E) is less than 1.) Note that here, our priors for 
B and Ejust say that "everything is possible". 
Given the above sample specification, we can compute the 
possibility of Ls"LE"LA "LR 11Lw "La <LB is either B 
or .., B, LE is either E or .., E. etc.) using a formula ((IV) 
below) that is derivable from the independence 
assumptions we made in specifying the graph. 
II(Ls"LE"LA"LR"LWALcJ.) 
I*= II(LB) * II0-£1LB) * Il(LAILB�t.LE) 
* II<LRILs"LE"LA) * IT(LwiLB"LE"LA"LR) 
Il(l.aJLs"LE"LA"LR"Lw) *I 
= ll(LB) * IT<I£) * ll(LAILB11LE) * IT(LRILE) 
* II(LwiLA) * Il(lGJLA) (IV) 
With formulas like (IV), we can compute, in theory at 
least, II( {ro}) for all ro (i.e., Ls"LE"LA "LR 11Lw �t.l.a). 
while II (�Ia ) is computed from II(a11�) I ll (a )  = 
max{:rt(w): ro E  [aA�]} I max{:rt(w): ro E [a]}. But 
clearly, if there are many primitives, then it will not be 
feasible to directly compute II (�Ia) from the joint 
possibility. This is why local computation techniques are 
developed in the first place. Below, we describe a local 
computation scheme. This scheme computes, for each 
primitive P, IT(Pia) and IT( -.Pia), where a is some 
342 Hsia 
conjunction of literals such as ..., WAGAR or -.RA WAG. 
Consider the alarm-problem again. There is a total of six 
specifications of IT-values. Each TI-specification involves 
one or more primitives, and the six groups of primitives 
are {B}. {E}. {B, E, A}, {E, R}, {A, W}, and {A, G}. It 
happens that we can arrange these six groups of primitives 
in a tree, with the property (called the MarkiJV property) 
that if two nodes u and v contain the same primitive P, 
then P is in every node on the path between u and v. In 
general, it may be the case that the groups of primitives 
involved cannot be arranged in a tree with the Markov 
property. When that happens, some additional groups of 
primitives will have to be added [Shenoy and Shenoy 90]. 
We are also allowed to add new groups of primitives as 
desired, so long as the Markov property is preserved. 
Figure 4.2: A Markov tree. 
Originally, we specified some TI-values for each group of 
primitives. Now let us translate each of these _n­
specifications into what is called a potential, and assoctate 
each potential with its corresponding node on the tree. 
B E A  E R  A W  A G  
T T T 1.00 T T 1.00 T T 1.00 T T 1.00 
T T F 0.05 T F 0.05 T F 0.80 T F 0.80 
T F T 1.00 F T 0.00 F T 1.00 F T 1.00 
T F F 0.40 F F 1.00 F F 1.00 F F 1.00 
F T T 1.00 
F T F 0.85 
_ 
B 
__ 
_E 
_
_ 
F F T 0.05 T 1.00 T 1.00 
F F F 1.00 F 1.00 F 1.00 
Figure 4.3: Potentials on the nodes of the Markov tree. 
In this translation, TI(AIBAE), for example, becomes the 
potential-value of the valuation (of {B, E, A}) BAEAA, 
while II(-.B). for example, becomes the potential-value of 
the v aluation -. B. If there were any additionally 
introduced group of primitives, then each valuation of 
these primitives would be assigned a potential-value of 1. 
We now need to give an informal introduction of the 
notion of combination and marginalization. Let g, h and 
k be the sets of primitives {B, E, A}. {B. E}. and {B, E, 
R}, respectively. If G is a potential on {B, E, A}, then 
G h, the m a rgin a l  of G for {B, E}, is such t h a t  
Gh(Ls.-.LE) = max{G(LsA LE.-.LA)} (we use Ls. for 
example, to mean either B or -.B). Combination (of two 
potentials) is simply pointwise multiplication. That is, if 
we use G®K, where K is a potential on k, to denote the 
result of combining G and K, then G®K (a potential on 
gUk) is such that G® K ( L B ALE ALA ALR ) = 
G(LB.-.LEALA) * K(LBAL£ALR)· If there does not exist 
any LB.-.LE.-.LA ALR such that G(LsALE ALA ) * 
K(LBALEALR) > 0, then we say that G and K are not 
combinable. 
Local computation is essentially a process o f  
marginalizing and combining potentials in a node by node 
fashion. For illustrative purposes, we just describe a one­
sweep process that (only) computes TI (BIWAR) and 
II( -.BIW .-.R). First, we attach two additional nodes {W} 
and {R} to the Markov tree in Figure 4.2. Each of these 
two nodes is linked to a superset node (here we have no 
choice but to link {W} to {A, W}, and {R} to {E, R}), 
and is needed for input or output purposes. The potential 
on {W} is such that F is assigned 0 and T is assigned 1. 
The potential on {R} is the same. Let us designate the 
node {B} as the root of the tree. When the computation 
starts, each leaf just makes its potential "available" to its 
parent. Then, every internal node does the following: it 
waits until all its children have made their potentials 
available to it, and then it combines these potentials with 
its own potential, and makes the resulting potential 
available to its own parent if there is one. When the 
whole process finishes, TI(BIWt.R) and TI(-.BIW t.R) are 
just the potential on {B} normalized, i.e., we divide the 
potential-values of B and -.B by their maximum. 
Shenoy [92] has shown that the above described local 
computation scheme satisfies the three axioms of Shenoy 
and Shafer [90]. This, together with formulas such as 
(IV), imply that the scheme correctly computes the desired 
conditional marginals of the joint possibility satisfying 
the given constraints (i.e., the modular specification). 
5 CONCLUSION 
We have shown that the notion of confidence transfer can 
be justified from a logic-based perspective, and we do so 
by giving an axiomatization of confidence transfer. Our 
axiomatization is basically a strengthening of Rott's 
proposal [Ron 91], which was originally intended to be 
used in the area of theory of belief revision. 
We also suggested that Dempster's rule of conditioning �s 
the only natural variation of confidence transfer that 1s 
known to support the notion of belief independence. It 
remains to be shown, however, that Dempster's rule is the 
only variation of confidence transfer that supports the 
notion of belief independence (in the sense of Theorem 
3.1). 
One might question the intuitive legitimacy of our 
approach. After all, it is quite obvious that some other 
criteria could have been used in choosing among different 
proposals of conditioning rules. Why must we use the 
notion of belief independence? Moreover, our definition 
of conditional independence seems to have a strong 
probabilistic flavor. Is this a hint then that our version of 
possibility theory is perhaps just some transformation of 
probability theory? Our answer to these questions is as 
follows. To start with, we think that belief independence 
is an a priori notion. After all, there are things in the 
world that are independent of each other, conditionally or 
otherwise. As such, our opinions of these "things " ought 
to be independent. And so, as long as we take the no�on 
of conditioning for granted, we should also take the notton 
of belief independence seriously. As for the definition of 
belief independence, it is just a matter of formulating our 
intuitive notion of belief independence in terms of our 
formal, generally accepted defmition of conditioning. It is 
true that our definition of belief independence looks just 
like the one in probability theory. But this should be 
interpreted to mean that we are on the right track (is there 
any other way of formulating our intuitive notion of 
belief independence?), and not that our theory is some 
transformation of probability theory. It is true that the 
"formal structure" of our version of possibility theory 
resembles that of probability theory. But "similar" is by 
no means "equal", and it is important to note that these 
two theories have completely opposite notions of belief. 
We also showed that if Dempster's rule is used as the 
"official"  rule of conditioning, then we can use the so­
called causal net technique to make modular specifications, 
and also use local computation to compute the desired 
conditional marginals of the underlying joint possibility. 
Our technique of modular specification is not new, nor is 
our technique of local computation. But we are the first 
to integrate these two techniques into possibility theory, 
using Dempster's rule of conditioning as the glue. 
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